Category: Science

Summary: Testing whether delayed adaptive sanctions with fatigue create a reentrant cooperation window as mobility changes in a spatial public-goods game.

Mobility can either spread cooperation or undermine it, and adaptive sanctioning can help only if it responds on the right timescale. This experiment asks whether delayed sanctions combined with sanction fatigue create a nonmonotone mobility window in which cooperation is restored, then lost again, instead of changing in a single direction.

The model couples a spatial public-goods game to sanctions that respond with delay and can weaken under repeated use. By scanning mobility while keeping that adaptive control structure in place, the experiment tests whether cooperation is highest at intermediate movement levels rather than at either extreme.

That interaction matters because fixed-sanction models miss the timing cost of real responses. The result is aimed at identifying whether adaptive punishment and mobility together produce a genuinely reentrant control regime.

Method: Spatial public-goods simulations sweeping mobility under delayed adaptive sanctions with fatigue-sensitive control.

What is measured: Cooperation level, mobility-dependent reentrant window structure, sanction activity, fatigue effects, and joint burden across regimes.